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After almost seventy years of civil war and armed conflict the peace process 
is considered to be the centerpiece of a future peaceful coexistence of the 
various ethnic groups in Myanmar. Peace negotiations under the former 
Thein Sein government led to the so called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
signed by 8 ethnic armed organisations out of approximately 21. The initia-
tion of the Panglong Peace Conferences by the succeeding National League 
for Democracy government aroused high hopes among ethnic minorities. 
Meanwhile, frustration over the faltering negotiations is growing. In Decem-
ber 2017 Christina Grein met with Dr. Sai Oo, Director of the Pyidaungsu 
Institute, to talk about the current situation of the negotiations and the 
 challenges ahead.
How did the Pyidaungsu Institute come to 
be founded?
Back in 2013, the Pyidaungsu Institute was set 
up in Chiang Mai, Thailand, because we couldn’t 
set up an office inside Myanmar. The director 
has been involved in the democratic movement, 
the ethnic and federal movement for many 
years. The idea of setting up this institute came 
up during the establishment of the Myanmar 
Peace Center for the Union-wide peace negotia-
tions. The ethnic groups realised that the nego-
tiations were solely under the government’s 
control. There was neither a forum for the eth-
nic minorities nor an understanding of their po-
sitions.
What was the role of the institute in the 
beginning?
During the last 5 years it has been a stony path 
in the peace process. Initially, we only provided 
technical support for the armed ethnic organi-
sations (EAOs). In the early phase of the peace 
process, we had a nationwide ceasefire agree-
ment (NCA). Here, we assisted the leaders of 
the EAOs with negotiating and the formulation 
of common principles and goals. We played 
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quite an important role in the drafting process 
of the NCA. We were also involved in drafting 
the political dialogue framework, which is to be 
followed after the signing of the NCA. An infor-
mal working group has been designing the 
framework. There have been a lot of consulta-
tions and the whole process took about 7 or 8 
months. In 2015, we moved with our head office 
to Yangon in order to work more closely with 
political parties and civil society organisations, 
but we still keep a small office in Chiang Mai.
What changed after the Pyidaungsu Insti-
tute moved its head office to Yangon? To 
what extend did this benefit your work?
As time passed, we developed a close relation-
ship with political parties and EAOs. As a mem-
ber of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Commit-
tee, we work closely with various key stakehold-
ers in the peace process. This body governs and 
manages the peace negotiations and the politi-
cal dialogue. Our staff is also working in the 
Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. Instead 
of providing assistance, we have been asked to 
represent the EAOs and to negotiate for them. 
That makes us very busy. One the one hand, we 
are not that independent anymore. But on the 
other hand, we have the advantage to better un-
derstand the debate and ongoing discussions 
and to get first-hand information. We aim to un-
derstand the gaps and needs in the negotia-
tions, for example the knowledge gaps. We are 
not necessarily taking the EAOs positions. There 
are many groups involved and their positions 
can be very diverse and sometimes also dis-
puted.
Negotiating with and for the diverse ethnic 
groups must be an interesting but also 
tough job. I presume that your personal 
background is somehow associated with 
the democracy movement in the country. 
Can you tell us more about that?
Back in 1988, during the democratic movement 
in the country, I was a young man to begin my 
university studies. I also had been involved in 
the anti-government movement and protest. 
That was a very rough time and many of us were 
imprisoned. I managed to escape and joined one 
of the EAOs in the northern Shan State. In 
1989 and 1990, I lived in Namkhan in the jun-
gle. It is all gone now, but this territory was then 
controlled by the Burmese Communist Party. 
After two years, the situation changed when 
General Khin Nyunt initiated ceasefires with the 
EAOs. I ended up as a refugee in Thailand for a 
while and later on got a scholarship to study in 
Australia. I went there to study for some time 
but regularly visited Thailand. After completing 
my studies, I worked at the University of West-
ern Sydney and in the Government of New 
South Wales. But there was something missing 
in my life. In 2013, I decided to come back to 
Myanmar. So I took the opportunity to work 
with the Pyidaungsu Institute. That was a very 
personal choice and a matter close to my heart.
To date, two Panglong Conferences have 
been held, and the third round is due to 
follow very soon. What is your assessment 
of the current state of the peace process?
The situation is getting increasingly complicated 
because of the many different interests of the 
EAOs. The military is still very powerful in the 
negotiations. The election victory of the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) created a lot of 
expectations. After a while we all realised that 
the NLD still has many things to learn in order 
to fulfill its role as the government. It is still in a 
quite weak position. Under the previous govern-
ment, the peace process had a slightly better 
position because there was a kind of informal 
dialogue. Under the NLD government, the mili-
tary treats the peace process as a security issue. 
That is a significant change. According to the 
NCA, the stakeholders have to sign the ceasefire 
agreement first. After that, there will be a polit-
ical dialogue with discussions about constitu-
tional change et cetera. Currently, we are mak-
ing no progress because the situation got more 
complicated. There is a number of organisations 
that didn’t sign the NCA yet: the heavily armed 
and powerful Northern Alliance1, which is in 
control of a large territory, and the United Na-
tionalities Federal Council2 (UNFC), which orig-
inally has been at the forefront of the NCA nego-
tiations but then somehow withdrew.
What were the reasons for the withdrawal 
of the UNFC?
I guess there are a lot of reasons. One main issue 
is that the UNFC didn’t want to give legitimacy 
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to the semi-civilian government under Thein 
Sein. Each organisation has some radical forces 
in their circle. These forces say: “We have been 
oppressed for so many years. Why are we nego-
tiating now? None of the things that we want is 
guaranteed”. Some people also want to have the 
answers before they go into negotiations. That is 
understandable. They have been deceived many 
times. Despite many ceasefires with the govern-
ment/ military, nothing has changed. But there 
are also some groups that are more pragmatic 
and see the peace process as an opportunity. 
These groups gave up their arms and agreed to 
participate in the political dialogue. They don’t 
want to keep fighting forever.
What role does the Northern Alliance play 
in the peace negotiations and what is their 
stance towards the NCA?
The Northern Alliance controls a large territory 
but it is situated in a remote area and has very 
little access to the international community. But 
it has a close relationship with China. Let’s take 
a closer look at the political argument: so far, 
the Northern Alliance doesn’t accept the NCA 
approach of the government. It wants a new ap-
proach, but so far it hasn’t demonstrated yet 
how this new approach looks like. A better op-
tion would be to try to push for additions in the 
current NCA. Since the NCA is nationally recog-
nized, it is impossible to replace the whole 
agreement. Besides, there is a further problem 
concerning the alliance. The Tatmadaw (armed 
forces of Myanmar) distinguishes between offi-
cially recognized groups and the so called “un-
lawful associations”. It is ready to negotiate 
with groups like the Kachin Independence Army, 
but will refrain from discussions with the Myan-
mar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta-
ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan 
Army. It is complicated by historical devep-
ments. The Myanmar National Democratic Al-
liance Army, a Kokang group, has been the very 
first to break away from the Communist Party of 
Burma and to agree to a ceasefire with the gov-
ernment in the 1990s. At that time it had a very 
good relationship with the government. The re-
gion underwent an economic boom with both 
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
and Tatmadaw troops making profits especially 
with opium and heroin. But in 2009, the army 
split in two factions, when government troops 
forced it to transform in Border Guard Forces.3 
One faction was willing to transform and got the 
exclusive control over the Kokang self-adminis-
tered zone. The other faction went underground 
and disappeared for a long time. In 2015, this 
group emerged and tried to retake this area. 
There were lots of casualties on the side of the 
Tatmadaw. It got very upset. The Arakan Army 
and Ta-ang National Liberation Army were sup-
porting the Myanmar National Democratic Al-
liance Army in its attack. The Kachin Independ-
ence Army was also accused of lending a help-
ing hand but they denied any involvement. From 
the Burmese perspective the attack was a terri-
tory issue, an invasion.
Kachin 
Independence 
Army cadets 
in Laiza, 
Kachin state 
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Last year the members of the Northern Al-
liance together with three other EAOs es-
tablished a new committee to hold collec-
tive talks with the government. Can you tell 
us more about the role of the United Wa 
State Army in this committee?
It is the leader of the Federal Political Negotiat-
ing and Consultative Committee, a coalition of 
seven armed groups including the members of 
the Northern Alliance. This committee demands 
to negotiate with the government as a coalition 
rather than as individual members. It is a difficult 
task trying to bring the United Wa State Army 
into the peace talks. In former times, the Wa peo-
ple and their territory were kind of separated 
from the rest of the country without any formal 
relationships. They had support from China’s 
Communist Party. And when Burma’s Communist 
Party broke down, they then became a nationalist 
organisation. They still have a very close rela-
tionship with China. For example, the children go 
to school in China, they use Chinese currency 
and mostly speak the Chinese language (Manda-
rin). Most of their leaders cannot speak Burmese. 
They were trained by the Burma Communist 
Party, which was aiming to turn Burma into a 
communist country. The good thing is that the Wa 
still want to be part of the country. But the Tat-
madaw is behaving in the same old fashion: beat 
them, divide them and then talk with them.
What are the biggest challenges of the 
peace process?
The Tatmadaw needs a much clearer strategy. 
Its approach has always been to weaken your 
enemy’s military position first before talking to 
them. It still prioritizes military solutions with 
expensive and very hard tactics. That is one pic-
ture. The Tatmadaw is not familiar with the po-
litical game yet. One of the UNFC’s demands is 
unconditional ceasefire for a certain period. But 
the Tatmadaw rejected. The ethnic groups ex-
pect the government to become more clever in 
the political game with the Tatmadaw. Because 
ethnic groups think that they share a lot of com-
mon ideas with the NLD government. The gov-
ernment needs to learn to change the game. So 
far, it has not been able to do that. There are 
also challenges on the side of the ethnic armed 
groups. Because of the diversity of groups in the 
coalitions, it is difficult to reach certain agree-
ments since the understanding of the peace pro-
cess and the needs vary. For the EAOs, the main 
focus points of the negotiations are federalism 
and changing the constitution. But just a few 
members of these groups have lived in federal 
countries at some point. So they don’t have any 
experiences with a federalist system.
Another ongoing challenge is getting the 
non-signatories involved in the peace process 
and to negotiate concerning the NCA. The mili-
tary persists in its position. Currently, there is 
some talk about this issue, but it has not reached 
any results yet. The demands on both sides are 
so far away from each other and the Tatmadaw 
is still using the divide and rule tactics, adopted 
from the British, against the EAOs. The result of 
that is a growing mistrust. They even use that 
strategy on the negotiation table. They would 
say “I only talk to you, but not to your friend. I 
cannot sit together with both of you. I will talk 
with your friend in a separate way”. The Tat-
madaw sees itself as the guardian of the consti-
tution. I think it has a wrong idea of its role.
You mentioned that federalism is a crucial 
issue for the ethnic groups. What does fed-
eralism mean for the EAOs and what role 
does it play in the political dialogue?
Their understanding of federalism is still very 
abstract, even though the ethnic groups on the 
Thai-Myanmar border have been studying and 
delved into that issue for a long time. They have 
good ideas of how federalism could shape the 
future landscape and they exchange about dif-
ferent forms and features. But they have grown 
up in a very centralized government system, so 
it is difficult for them to completely move away 
from that concept. That means that there are a 
lot of limitations. The understanding of the fed-
eral negotiations needs to be broadened. But 
the ethnic groups don’t have enough resources, 
human as well as other necessary resources. 
This will exhaust them in the long term.
There are discussions underway on the issue of 
resource federalism. The current negotiations 
include five topics: politics, security, economy, 
social aspects, natural resources and environ-
ment. They will discuss issues like whether the 
Union or the federal government will get the au-
thority over land management issues and how to 
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manage the revenues. But to really work on a 
policy, the constitution would have to be changed 
or amended. The current constitution gives the 
state governments the possibility to collect 
taxes, but these are far too low. A policy on rev-
enue sharing should be based on the needs of 
each state. If you look at the state governments, 
they have a very small budget and no capacity.
Is there a good relationship and exchange 
between the various EAOs?
They regularly meet for discussions and nego-
tiations. Each organisation sends two to three 
delegates. But many delegates are inexpe-
rienced or are not well prepared. That is a big 
problem within the EAOs. In order to achieve 
successful negotiations, we need the decision 
makers or key negotiators at the table. People, 
who can respond quickly and have a good un-
derstanding of the issues. Unfortunately, politi-
cal negotiation is a new game for EAOs. They 
have mastered skills in fighting with arms in the 
jungle but have very limited capacities in polit-
ical negotiation.
The states of the ethnic minorities are rich 
in natural resources but with poor infra-
structure, a lack of education facilities and 
job opportunities. Is economic development 
an issue in the negotiations?
The current negotiation includes issues of eco-
nomic development, but that is talk about a fu-
ture federal Union. The NCA mentions the de-
velopment of local communities that has to be 
implemented in the interim period. I guess the 
government was thinking that if they support 
development in the ethnic regions everything 
will get better. But that is not the case. Develop-
ment alone won’t bring peace. Previously 
(1990s), the government used a particular 
ceasefire-model. If the ethnic groups under-
signed a ceasefire agreement, they would be 
free to engage in the development of their re-
spective regions and to support local busi-
nesses. That was a kind of incentive. But in the 
end, the army generals and some organisations 
enriched themselves personally. There was the 
attitude “just take what you can”, for example 
in the timber industry. And within 20 years, a 
huge part of Myanmar’s forests has vanished.
China’s economy is steadily growing, so what-
ever you can sell, China will take it – timber, 
rubies from southern Shan State, Jade from 
Kachin State and other mining products. But 
Chinese businesses are not supporting a re-
sponsible development. China now provides 
cash crops for export to China. The most popu-
lar crops are watermelon (for chinese new year), 
banana and corn. In the past, the local popula-
tion played an important role in Chinese busi-
nesses activities, as work force for example. But 
since they switched their focus on high-tech ag-
riculture, they are in need of personnel with 
specialized knowledge. They don’t hire local 
farmers anymore. So an increasing number of 
Chinese workers are brought in to work on the 
plantations. These kinds of investments are not 
Wa State, 
Northern 
Shan 
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What kind of economic development could 
possibly contribute to the promotion of 
peace?
Economic development is urgently needed. We 
need to improve the living standards of the local 
people. Poverty and the lack of education are 
the most important push factors for the local 
people to join the resistance. But investment 
has to be responsible. We need different forms 
of introducing local development. We need a fo-
cus on local participation and a maximum re-
turn to locals. Besides, the business activities 
should be adapted to their skills. It would be the 
best way to announce a moratorium on the ex-
traction of natural resources, at least for now. 
Because in most cases, the profits don’t go to 
the locals. During the ceasefire period, the local 
people suffered the most. Although they sit next 
to the rich jade or ruby mines, they are poor. In 
addition, a number of ethnic communities suffer 
from the side effects of the black economy, like 
a high rate of drug abuse and human trafficking. 
The former government’s management of natu-
ral resources was flawed but the current gov-
ernment seeks to promote a more responsible 
management. They banned the cutting and sell-
ing of timber and announced that all remaining 
jade mining licenses will expire in 2018. This is 
a good step but let’s see how it goes. They now 
have to renew some of the licenses, because 
there is a lot of debt to be paid to China.
Notes
1 Members of the Northern Alliance: Kachin Independence Army,
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta-ang National Lib-
eration Army, Arakan Army.
2 Members of the UNFC: New Mon State Party, Karenni National Pro-
gressive Party, Lahu Democratic Union, Arakan National Council.
3 Border Guard Forces are militias, created by the Tatmadaw in 2009 
and 2010. They consist of former insurgent groups under the in-
struction of regional Tatmadaw commands. 
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